Allied lawmakers explore NATO's strategic imperatives in North Atlantic during Nordic visit

NATO Allies have rightly identified Russia as the most significant and direct threat to Euro-Atlantic security. Today, Russia’s increasingly aggressive military and political posture toward NATO Allies poses an acute 360-degree security challenge. In addition to eastern flank reinforcement and bolstering, Allies must also ensure the safety and security of the North Atlantic itself – the air space, waters and seabed which constitute the physical manifestation of the transatlantic link that continues to bind NATO Allies together in a common purpose. 

To gain better insights into the region’s strategic importance and of Allied efforts to ensure North Atlantic security and High North access and interests, a delegation from the Defence and Security and Political Committees at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly travelled to Denmark, the Faroe Islands, and Iceland from 30 June to 4 July. The joint Committee visit was led by Cheryl Gallant, Chairperson of the Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Relations (PCTR), and the Rt. Hon. Lord Mark Lancaster, Chairperson of the Defence and Security Committee (DSCFC). 

The Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap lies at the strategic centre of North Atlantic security. Over the course of the Cold War, Allies understood the vital mission of monitoring and tracking non-Allied activity in the North Atlantic, particularly the threat of submarine activity that could menace sea lanes of communication, or even the safety and security of Allies’ Atlantic coasts. Control over this area, therefore, has always been a first order task of NATO’s deterrence and defence efforts. 

Today, Russia’s advanced modern submarines are increasingly viewed as a threat the security of the North Atlantic – once again threatening critical Allied sea lanes of communication connecting North America and Europe and, just as vitally, to sever the complex web of undersea fibre optic cables fuelling almost all aspects of modern digital life. 

At the vanguard of the defence of the GIUK Gap are the coordinated defensive efforts of Denmark, the United Kingdom, Iceland, and, by virtue of its 1952 bilateral defence agreement with Iceland, the United States. The Danish Kingdom includes both Greenland and the Faroe Islands, and Denmark continues to provide for the external foreign defence of both autonomous territories. 

The defence of the North Atlantic and Arctic region is complicated by the rapidly changing environment itself, due to the impact of climate change, which is happening at four times the rate across the region when compared to the rest of the globe. Receding ice sheets and longer open-water seasons are inviting increased attention and activity to the region as the once-closed Arctic is today fast becoming an avenue of global transport, an area for resource extraction and exploration, and an arena for great power competition – a fact made clear by growing China-Russia Arctic cooperation. 

NATO Allies are certainly keenly aware of  the growing importance of the High North and the new realities of the 21st century Arctic. After Finland and Sweden’s recent accession, NATO Allies now make up 7 of the 8 Arctic states (4 of the 5 Arctic littoral states). As such, they are taking steps to adapt their capabilities to defend current and potential future interests in the High North. A key shared concern is the maintenance of Allied freedom of navigation as Arctic sea lanes will continue to grow in strategic importance.

Denmark – a steadfast Ally

In Copenhagen, Danish government officials and leading academics reaffirmed Denmark’s strong commitment to NATO’s enhanced defence and deterrence efforts. According to Danish intelligence assessments, Russia could be ready to threaten the security of certain NATO Allies within the next two years and may have the capacity to wage a broader regional war within five years.

Flemming Splidsboel, Denmark’s foremost expert on Russia, warned that the Russian regime has evolved into a totalitarian system relying on a state of perpetual war to suppress internal dissent. He argued that NATO Allies should place greater emphasis on deterrence by punishment, rather than relying primarily on deterrence by resilience.

This growing sense of urgency is driving Denmark’s increased emphasis on defence and deterrence. The country is significantly boosting its defence spending, aiming to reach 3.2% of GDP by 2026. It is also investing in the capabilities needed to implement NATO’s defence plans and is expanding its system of conscription.

A key challenge for Denmark’s defence strategy lies in balancing its resources between its commitments in the Baltic Sea and its responsibilities in the North Atlantic and Arctic regions. To address this, Denmark is finalising a new political agreement that will allocate an additional EUR 2 billion towards strengthening security in the High North. This investment will focus on enhancing strategic enablers to improve situational awareness around Greenland and the Faroe Islands. Planned initiatives include the procurement of new patrol vessels, sea-based helicopters, and an increased frigate presence (equipped with anti-submarine warfare capabilities) in ice-free waters. It is worth noting that while the Kingdom of Denmark holds responsibility for the defence of both Greenland and the Faroe Islands, these territories are playing an increasingly active role in shaping the Kingdom’s defence and security policy.

As Denmark prepares to assume the EU Presidency, the visiting delegation was informed that one of its top priorities will be to strengthen Europe’s role as a defence and security actor, with particular emphasis on bolstering the European defence industry. Denmark regards the EU’s defence and security initiatives as complementary to NATO, rather than as a rival effort, underlining the importance of involving non-EU Allies in European defence industrial projects.

Denmark is also providing exceptional support to Ukraine, contributing an amount equivalent to 0.5% of its GDP – among the highest levels both per capita and in absolute terms. The Danish Model for supporting Ukraine’s defence industry involves direct financial support to Ukrainian companies, which are often able to produce equipment more quickly and at significantly lower cost. In a further step, Denmark has invited Ukrainian defence firms to establish production facilities on Danish soil. Delegates were told that this model of integrating the Danish and Ukrainian defence industries is not only highly efficient but also mutually beneficial.

Denmark is also embracing a whole-of-society approach to security, recently establishing a dedicated Ministry for Resilience and Preparedness. According to Minister Torsten Schack, the creation of the new Ministry has attracted considerable attention both at home and abroad. The Ministry is responsible for coordinating Denmark’s efforts in areas such as countering hybrid threats, protecting undersea infrastructure, cyber security, search and rescue operations, and emergency response services. Regarding undersea cables, the Minister highlighted the need to have sufficient redundancy and improve situational awareness to better safeguard these critical assets.

Faroe Islands – From Periphery to Strategic Centre

Once considered a remote outpost, the Faroe Islands are increasingly recognised as a strategically important location in the evolving security landscape of the North Atlantic. Their geographic position between the UK, Iceland, and Norway places them at the heart of vital sea lanes and surveillance zones, making them a key asset in Allied efforts to enhance situational awareness and defence in the High North. The Faroe Islands operate under a unique constitutional arrangement stemming from the 1946 referendum, with home rule and shared responsibility with Denmark in areas such as foreign policy and defence.

In Tórshavn, Faroe politicians and officials stressed that, as security dynamics in the Arctic and North Atlantic shift, the Faroe Islands are becoming more actively involved in shaping defence and security policies within the Kingdom of Denmark. In 2024, the Faroe Islands adopted a new national security policy that marks a significant shift towards a more active engagement in regional and collective defence. 

A key symbol of this shift is the agreement, reached in 2022, to establish an air surveillance radar on Mount Sornfelli in the Faroe Islands, which will be a critical asset for NATO operations in the North Atlantic. The delegation had the opportunity visit the site on Mount Sornfelli, which currently hosts non-military radars used mainly for air traffic control.

Faroese interlocutors noted that, unlike the past – when defence infrastructure like radars were established without local involvement – today’s approach is characterised by active involvement of Faroese authorities and citizens. The islands now regularly host NATO maritime exercises, including the 2024 visit of the USS Albany, with increasing involvement from the Faroese Coast Guard. In the Faroe Islands, Commander Bárður F. Sandá, briefed the delegation about the activities of Denmark’s Joint Arctic Command (JACO), which has a Liaison Element in the Faroe Islands. In addition to the defence of Greenland and the Faroe Islands, JACO coordinates search and rescue missions and disaster relief operations across this vast area. Diplomatically, the Faroes maintain a growing international presence with representations in several cities, including Brussels and Washington. 

Bjarni Kárason Petersen, Minister of Justice, stressed that the Faroe Islands are fully responsible for their civil preparedness and are currently updating their threat assessments, especially in response to rising tensions and increased nuclear submarine activity in surrounding waters. Faroese society is highly digitalised, making bolstering digital infrastructure and cybersecurity a crucial priority. Special attention is being given to securing the two critical connectivity cables on which the islands depend, as well as exploring alternatives such as Starlink for added redundancy. Efforts are also underway to improve energy storage, given the unpredictability of green power sources. The Minister also noted that the Faroese economy is highly open and dependent on trade, with fisheries being the leading sector. Therefore, the government is taking steps to diversify into other sectors such as IT and aquaculture to reduce economic vulnerability. 

The delegation also visited the Atlantic Airways Aviation Academy, where state-of-the-art simulators are used to train both fixed-wing and rotary-wing pilots to operate in the demanding conditions of the Faroese environment.

Iceland and the GIUK Gap

The delegation concluded its High North and GIUK Gap tour with a final stop in Iceland, a nation that plays a critical role in Allied deterrence and defence efforts across the North Atlantic and Arctic. Despite not maintaining its own armed forces, Iceland is a vital NATO Ally, significantly contributing to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations in these strategically important regions.
Iceland’s external defence is safeguarded through a long-standing bilateral agreement with the United States, with a central focus today on U.S.-led anti-submarine warfare operations based out of Keflavik Air Base. This installation also hosts NATO’s only Arctic air policing mission, which ensures the security of Iceland’s airspace. During the delegation’s visit, the Czech Air Force was preparing to transfer mission responsibilities to the Belgian Air Force.
As NATO enhances its presence and capabilities in the High North, Iceland is concurrently expanding its domestic capacities to support this effort. Close collaboration among Allies is improving regional awareness and enabling more coordinated surface and subsurface operations, enhancing overall deterrence and defence capabilities in the High North.

Iceland is also advancing its national defence and deterrence posture through the development of its first-ever national defence policy. This initiative will not only strengthen the country's role in supporting NATO missions in and around Iceland but also promote broader societal resilience.
On the ground, Iceland’s Coast Guard and National Police play a pivotal role in domestic defence-related functions, from conducting search and rescue missions to providing host-nation support for NATO activities.

Geographically, Iceland is a vital communications hub linking Greenland, Iceland, and the Faroe Islands. As a result, there is growing attention to the security of critical infrastructure, particularly undersea cables that connect the island to mainland Europe.

The delegation also visited Teledyne Gavia, an Icelandic company at the forefront of defence innovation. Specialising in advanced autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs), Teledyne Gavia exemplifies Iceland’s small but dynamic defence industrial sector. The acquisition and deployment of AUVs are expected to be increasingly important for Allies as they work to enhance strategic situational awareness in the busy waters of the North Atlantic.

During a visit to the HS Orka plant, briefers emphasised that in response to both the immediate and future impacts of climate change, Iceland has nearly eliminated its reliance on imported fossil fuels, transforming its energy system. Today, almost 100% of Iceland’s domestic electricity comes from renewable sources: The country aims for all vehicles to be electric by 2030 and to achieve full carbon neutrality by 2040.

Iceland has leveraged its unique location between the North American and Eurasian tectonic plates, as well as its abundant rivers and lakes, to harness geothermal and hydropower energy. Currently, approximately 70% of Iceland’s electricity comes from hydropower and 30% from geothermal sources. Additionally, around 90% of heating needs across the island are met through geothermal energy, distributed via an extensive system of insulated pipelines.
With a surplus of renewable electricity, Iceland has attracted energy-intensive industries such as aluminium smelting by offering low-cost power – as a briefer noted, due to the energy intensity of aluminium smelting, Iceland views aluminium companies as offsetting their carbon output by using Iceland’s green energy for processes. Ongoing research into more efficient geothermal extraction and advanced carbon capture technologies continues to enhance the country’s energy strategy. Experts underscored that such innovations are essential for ensuring long-term global sustainability.

The NATO Parliamentary Assembly is institutionally separate from NATO but serves as an essential link between NATO and the parliaments of the NATO nations. It provides greater transparency of NATO policies and fosters better understanding of the Alliance’s objectives and missions among legislators and citizens of the Alliance.  

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